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JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE
41 Globalization as Hybridization

The most common interpretations of globalization are the idea that the world is becoming more uniform and standardized, through a technological, commercial, and cultural synchronization emanating from the West, and that globalization is tied up with modernity. These perspectives are interrelated, if only in that they are both variations on an underlying theme of globalization as westernization. The former is critical in intent while the latter is ambiguous. My argument takes issue with both these interpretations as narrow

assessments of globalization and instead argues for viewing globalization as a process of hybridization that gives rise to a global mélange.

Globalizations Plural

Globalization, according to Albrow, "refers to all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, global society" (1990: 9). Since these processes are plural, we may as well conceive of globalizations in the plural. Thus, in social science there are as many conceptualizations of globalization as there are disciplines. In economics, globalization refers to economic internationalization and the spread of capitalist market relations. "The global economy is the system generated by globalising production and global finance" (Cox 1992: 30). In international relations, the focus is on the increasing density of interstate relations and the development of global politics. In sociology, the concern is with increasing worldwide social densities and the emergence of "world society." In cultural studies, the focus is on global communications and worldwide cultural standardization, as in Coca-colonization and McDonaldization, and on postcolonial culture. In history, the concern is with conceptualizing "global history" (Mazlish and Buultjens 1993). *All* these approaches and themes are relevant if we view globalization as a multidimensional process, which, like all significant social processes, unfolds in multiple realms of existence simultaneously. Accordingly, globalization may be understood in terms of an open-ended synthesis of several disciplinary approaches. This extends beyond social science – for instance, to ecological concerns, technology, and agricultural techniques. Another way to conceive of globalizations plural is that there are as many modes of globalization as there are globalizing agents and dynamics or impulses. Historically these range from long-distance cross-cultural trade, religious organizations, and knowledge networks to contemporary multinational corporations, banks, international institutions, technological exchange, and transnational social movements networks. We can further differentiate between globalization as policy and project, as in the case of Amnesty International, which is concerned with internationalizing human rights standards; or as unintended consequence, as in the case of the "globalizing panic" of AIDS. *Globalism* is the policy of furthering or managing (a particular mode of) globalization. In political economy, it refers to policies furthering economic internationalization or to the corporate globalism of transnational enterprises; and in foreign affairs, to the global stance in U.S. foreign policy, both in its initial postwar posture (Ambrose 1971) and its post-Cold War stance. These varied dimensions all point to the inherent fluidity, indeterminacy, and open-endedness of globalizations. If this is the point of departure it becomes less obvious to think of globalizations in terms of standardization and less likely that globalizations can be one-directional processes, either structurally or culturally.

Modernity is a keynote in reflections on globalization in sociology. In several prominent conceptualizations, globalization is the corollary of modernity (e.g., Giddens 1990).[1] It's not difficult to understand this trend. In conjunction with globalization, modernity provides a structure and periodization. In addition, this move reflects the general thematization of modernity in social science from Jürgen Habermas to Marshall Berman. Together globalization and modernity make up a ready-made package. Ready-made because it closely resembles the earlier, well-established conceptualization of globalization: the Marxist theme of the spread of the world market. The timing and pace are the same in both interpretations: the process starts in the 1500s and experiences its high tide from the late nineteenth century. The structures are the same: the nation state and individualization – vehicles of modernity or, in the Marxist paradigm, corollaries of the spread of the world market. In one view, universalism refers to the logic of the market and the law of value, and in the other, to modern values of achievement. World-system theory is the most well-known conceptualization of globalization in the Marxist lineage; its achievement has been to make "society" as the unit of analysis appear a narrow focus, while on the other hand it faithfully replicates the familiar constraints of Marxist determinism (Nederveen Pieterse 1987).

There are several problems associated with the modernity/globalization approach. In either conceptualization, whether centered on capitalism or modernity, globalization begins in and emanates from Europe and the West. In effect, it is a theory of westernization by another name, which replicates all the problems associated with Eurocentrism: a narrow window on the world, historically and culturally. With this agenda, it should be called westernization and not globalization. Another problem is

that globalization theory turns into or becomes an annex of modernization theory. While modernization theory is a passed station in sociology and development theory it is making a comeback under the name of globalization – the 1950s and 1960s revisited under a wide global umbrella. Roland Robertson takes issue with the prioritization of modernity in Giddens' work (1992: 138–45). Robertson's approach to globalization is multidimensional with an emphasis on sociocultural processes. Yet his preoccupation with themes such as "global order" is, according to Arnason, "indicative of a Parsonian approach, transferred from an artificially isolated and unified society to the global condition" (1990: 222). The re-thematization of modernity (Tiryakian 1991) indicates the continuing interest in modernization thinking, but the problems remain. The tendency to focus on social structure produces an account from which the dark side of modernity is omitted. What of modernity in the light of Bauman's *Modernity and the Holocaust*? While the Marxist perspective involves a critical agenda, the thematization of modernity, whether or not it serves as a stand-in for capitalism, does not: "The ambiguities involved in this discourse are such that it is possible, within it, to lose any sense of cultural domination: to speak of modernity can be to speak of cultural change as 'cultural fate' in the strong sense of historical... inevitability. This would be to abandon any project of rational cultural critique" (Tomlinson 1991: 141).

Generally, questions of power are marginalized in both the capitalism and modernity perspectives. Another dimension that is conspicuously absent from modernity accounts is imperialism. Modernity accounts tend to be societally inward looking, in a rarefied sociological narrative, as if modernity precedes and conditions globalization, and not the other way round: globalization constituting one of the conditions for modernity. The implication of the modernity/globalization view is that the history of globalization begins with the history of the West. But is it not precisely the point of globalizations as a perspective that globalizations begin with world history? The modernity/globalization view is not only geographically narrow (westernization) but also historically shallow (1500 plus). The time frame of some of the relevant perspectives is as follows (Table 41.1).

Apparently the broad heading of globalization accommodates some very different views. The basic understanding is usually a neutral formulation, such as "Globalization can thus be defined as the intensi-

Table 41.1 Timing of globalization

Author	Start	Theme
Marx	1500s	Modern capitalism
Wallerstein	1500s	Modern world-system
Robertson	1500s, 1870–1920s	Multidimensionalism
Giddens	1800s	Modernity
Tomlinson	1960s	Cultural planetarization

fication of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Giddens 1990: 64). The "intensification of worldwide social relations" can be thought of as a long-term process that finds its beginnings in the first migrations of peoples and long distance trade connections, and subsequently accelerates under particular conditions (the spread of technologies, religions, literacy, empires, capitalism). Or, it can be thought of as consisting only of the later stages of this process, from the time of the accelerating formation of global social relations, and as a specifically global momentum associated with particular conditions (the development of a world market, western imperialism, modernity). It can be narrowed down further by regarding globalization as a particular epoch and formation – as in Tomlinson's view of globalization as the successor to imperialism (rather than imperialism being a mode of globalization), Jameson's view of the new cultural space created by late capitalism, and David Harvey's argument that associates globalization with the postmodern condition of time-space compression and flexible accumulation. But, whichever the emphasis, globalization as the "intensification of worldwide social relations" presumes the prior existence of "worldwide social relations," so that globalization is the conceptualization of a *phase* following an existing condition of *globality* and part of an ongoing process of the formation of worldwide social relations. This recognition of historical depth brings globalizations back to world history and beyond the radius of modernity/westernization.

One way around the problem of modernization/ westernization is the idea of multiple *paths* of modernization, which avoids the onus of Eurocentrism and provides an angle for reproblematizing western development. Benjamin Nelson advances this as

part of his concern with "inter-civilizational encounters" (1981). The idea that "all societies create their own modernity," or at any rate of alternative modernities is now a salient theme (Gaonkar 2001; Eisenstadt 2002).

The modernizations plural approach matches the notion of the *historicity* of modernization, which is common in South and East Asia (Singh 1989). That Japanese modernization has followed a different path from that of the West is a cliché in Japanese sociology (Tominaga 1990) and well established in Taiwan and China (Li 1989; Sonoda 1990). It results in an outlook that resembles the argument of polycentrism and multiple paths of development (Amin 1990). But this remains a static and one-dimensional representation: the multiplication of centers still hinges on centrism. It's not much use to make up for Eurocentrism and occidental narcissism by opting for other centrisms such as Sinocentrism, Indocentrism, Afrocentrism, or polycentrism. In effect, this echoes the turn of the century Pan-movements: Pan-Slavism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Europeanism, Pan-Africanism, and so forth, in which the logic of nineteenth-century racial classifications is carried further under the heading of civilizational provinces turned into political projects. This may substitute one centrism and parochialism for another and miss the fundamental point of the "globalization of diversity," of the mélange effect pervading everywhere, from the heartlands to the extremities and vice versa.

Structural Hybridization

With respect to cultural forms, hybridization is defined as "the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices" (Rowe and Schelling 1991: 231). This principle also applies to structural forms of social organization.

It is by now a familiar argument that nation state formation is an expression and function of globalization and not a process contrary to it (Greenfield 1992). At the same time it is apparent that the present phase of globalization involves the relative weakening of nation states – as in the weakening of the "national economy" in the context of economic globalism and, culturally, the decline of patriotism. But this too is not simply a one-directional process. Thus, the migration movements that make up demographic globalization

can engender absentee patriotism and long-distance nationalism, as in the political affinities of Irish, Jewish, and Palestinian diasporas and émigré or exiled Sikhs in Toronto, Tamils in London, Kurds in Germany, Tibetans in India (Anderson 1992).

Globalization can mean the reinforcement of or go together with localism, as in "Think globally, act locally." This kind of tandem operation of local/global dynamics, or glocalization, is at work in the case of minorities who appeal to transnational human rights standards beyond state authorities, or indigenous peoples who find support for local demands from transnational networks. The upsurge of ethnic identity politics and religious revival movements can also be viewed in the light of globalization. "Identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people assert local loyalties but want to share in global values and lifestyles" (Ken Booth quoted in Lipschutz 1992: 396). *Particularity*, notes Robertson, is a *global* value and what is taking place is a "universalization of particularism" or "the global valorization of particular identities" (1992: 130).

Global dynamics such as the fluctuations of commodity prices on the world market can result in the reconstruction of ethnic identities, as occurred in Africa in the 1980s (Shaw 1986). State development policies can engender a backlash of ethnic movements (Kothari 1988). Thus "globalisation can engender an awareness of political difference as much as an awareness of common identity; enhanced international communications can highlight conflicts of interest and ideology, and not merely remove obstacles to mutual understanding" (Held 1992: 32).

Globalization can mean the reinforcement of both supranational and subnational regionalism. The European Union is a case in point. Formed in response to economic challenges from Japan and the United States, it represents more than the internal market and is becoming an administrative, legal, political, and cultural formation, involving multiple Europes: a Europe of the nations, the regions, "European civilization," Christianities, and so on. The dialectics of unification mean, for instance, that constituencies in Northern Ireland can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on decisions of the British courts, or that Catalonia can outflank Madrid and Brittany outmaneuver Paris by appealing to Brussels or by establishing links with other regions (e.g., between Catalonia and the Ruhr area). Again, there is an ongoing flow or cascade of globalization–regionalism–subregionalism. Or, "Globalization

encourages macro-regionalism, which, in turn, encourages micro-regionalism" (Cox 1992: 34).

> Micro-regionalism in poor areas will be a means not only of affirming cultural identities but of claiming pay-offs at the macro-regional level for maintaining political stability and economic good behaviour. The issues of redistribution are thereby raised from the sovereign state level to the macro-regional level, while the manner in which redistributed wealth is used becomes decentralised to the micro-regional level. (ibid.: 35)

What globalization means in structural terms, then, is the *increase in the available modes of organization*: transnational, international, macroregional, national, microregional, municipal, local. This ladder of administrative levels is being crisscrossed by *functional networks* of corporations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, as well as professionals and computer users. This approximates Rosenau's "postinternational politics," made up of two interactive worlds with overlapping memberships: a state-centric world, in which the primary actors are national, and a multicentric world of diverse actors such as corporations, international organizations, ethnic groups, churches (1990). These multicentric functional networks in turn are nested within broader sprawling "scapes," such as finanscapes, ethnoscapes (Appadurai 1990). Furthermore, not only these modes of organization are important but also the informal spaces that are created in between, the interstices. Inhabited by diasporas, migrants, exiles, refugees, nomads, these are sites of what the sociologist Michael Mann (1986) calls "interstitial emergence" and identifies as important sources of social renewal.

Also in political economy, we can identify a wide range of hybrid formations. The articulation of modes of production follows a principle of hybridization. The dual economy argument saw neatly divided economic sectors whilst the articulation argument sees interactive sectors giving rise to mélange effects, such as "semi-proletarians" who have one foot in the agrarian subsistence sector. Counterpoised to the idea of the dual economy split in traditional/modern and feudal/capitalist sectors, the articulation argument holds that what has been taking place is an interpenetration of modes of production. Uneven articulation in turn gives rise to asymmetric integration (Terhal 1987). Dependency theory may be read as a theory of structural hybridization in which dependent capitalism is a mélange category in which the logics of capitalism and imperialism have merged. Recognition of this hybrid condition is what distinguishes neo-Marxism from classical Marxism (in which capital was regarded as a "permanently revolutionizing force"): that is, regular capitalism makes for development but dependent capitalism makes for the "development of underdevelopment." The contested notion of semi-periphery may also be viewed as a hybrid formation.[2] In a wider context, the mixed economy, the informal sector, and the "third sector" of the "social economy," comprising cooperative and nonprofit organizations, may be viewed as hybrid economic formations. Social capital, civic entrepreneurship, and corporate citizenship – all themes of our times – are thoroughly hybrid in character.

Hybrid formations constituted by the interpenetration of diverse logics manifest themselves in *hybrid sites* and spaces. Thus, urbanization amidst the fusion of precapitalist and capitalist modes of production, as in parts of Latin America, may give rise to "cities of peasants" (Roberts 1978). Border zones are the meeting places of different organizational modes – such as free enterprise zones and offshore banking facilities (hybrid meeting places of state sovereignty and transnational enterprise), overseas military facilities, and surveillance stations (Enloe 1989). Borderlands generally are a significant topos (Anzaldúa 1987). The blurring and reworking of public and private spaces is a familiar theme (Helly and Reverby 1992). Global cities and ethnic mélange neighborhoods within them (such as Jackson Heights in Queens, New York) are other hybrid spaces in the global landscape. The use of information technology in supranational financial transactions (Wachtel 1990) gives rise to a hyper-space of capital.

Another dimension of hybridity concerns the experience of time, as in the notion of *mixed times* (tiempos mixtos) common in Latin America, where it refers to the coexistence and interspersion of premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity (Caldéron 1988; Vargas 1992). A similar point is that "intrinsic asynchrony" is a "general characteristic of Third World cultures" (Hösle 1992: 237).

Globalization, then, increases the range of organizational options, all of which are in operation simultaneously. Each or a combination of these may be relevant in specific social, institutional, legal, political, economic, or cultural spheres. What matters is that

no single mode has a necessary overall priority or monopoly. This is one of the salient differences between the present phase of globalization and the preceding era from the 1840s to the 1960s, the great age of nationalism when by and large the nation state was the single dominant organizational option. While the spread of the nation state has been an expression of globalization, the dynamic has not stopped there.

The overall tendency towards increasing global density and interdependence, or globalization, translates, then, into the pluralization of organizational forms. Structural hybridization and the mélange of diverse modes of organization give rise to a pluralization of forms of cooperation and competition as well as to novel mixed forms of cooperation. This is the structural corollary to flexible specialization and just-in-time capitalism and, on the other hand, to cultural hybridization and multiple identities. Multiple identities and the decentering of the social subject are grounded in the ability of individuals to avail themselves of several organizational options at the same time. Thus globalization is the framework for the diversification and amplification of "sources of the self."

A different concern is the scope and depth of the historical field. The westernization/modernity views on globalization only permit a global momentum with a short memory. Globalization taken widely however refers to the formation of a worldwide historical field and involves the development of global memory, arising from shared global experiences. Such shared global experiences range from intercivilizational encounters such as long-distance trade and migration to slavery, conquest, war, imperialism, colonialism. It has been argued that the latter would be irrelevant to global culture:

> Unlike national cultures, a global culture is essentially memoryless. When the "nation" can be constructed so as to draw upon and revive latent popular experiences and needs, a "global culture" answers to no living needs, no identity-in-the-making. . . . There are no "world memories" that can be used to *unite* humanity; the most global experiences to date – colonialism and the World Wars – can only serve to remind us of our historic cleavages. (Smith 1990: 180)

If, however, conflict, conquest, and oppression would *only* divide people, then nations themselves would merely be artifacts of division for they too were

mostly born out of conflict (e.g., Hechter 1975). Likewise, on the larger canvas, it would be shallow and erroneous to argue that the experiences of conflict merely divide humanity: they also unite humankind, even if in painful ways and producing an ambivalent kind of unity (Abdel-Malek 1981; Nederveen Pieterse 1989). Unity emerging out of antagonism and conflict is the ABC of dialectics. It is a recurrent theme in postcolonial literature, for example, *The Intimate Enemy* (Nandy 1983). The intimacy constituted by repression and resistance is not an uncommon notion either, as hinted in the title of the Israeli author Uri Avneri's book about Palestinians, *My Friend the Enemy* (1986). A conflictual unity bonded by common political and cultural experiences, including the experience of domination, has been part of the make-up of hybrid postcolonial cultures. Thus, the former British Empire remains in many ways a unitary space featuring a common language, common elements in legal and political systems, infrastructure, traffic rules, an imperial architecture that is in many ways the same in India as in South Africa, along with the legacy of the Commonwealth (King 1990).

Robertson makes reference to the deep history of globality, particularly in relation to the spread of world religions, but reserves the notion of globalization for later periods, starting in the 1500s, considering that what changes over time is "the scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single place." In his view, "contemporary globalization" also refers to "cultural and subjective matters" and involves *awareness* of the global human condition, a global consciousness that carries reflexive connotations (1992: 183). No doubt this reflexivity is significant, also because it signals the potential capability to act upon the global human condition. On the other hand, there is no good reason why such reflexivity should halt at the gates of the West and not also arise from and be cognizant of the deep history of intercivilizational connections including the influence of the world religions.

Global Mélange

How do we come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos, and Mardi Gras Indians in the United States, or "Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the

style of Isadora Duncan" (Rowe and Schelling 1991: 161)? How do we interpret Peter Brook directing the Mahabharata, or Ariane Mnouchkine staging a Shakespeare play in Japanese Kabuki style for a Paris audience in the Théâtre Soleil? Cultural experiences, past or present, have not been simply moving in the direction of cultural uniformity and standardization. This is not to say that the notion of global cultural synchronization (Schiller 1989) is irrelevant, on the contrary, but it is fundamentally incomplete. It overlooks the countercurrents – the impact nonwestern cultures have been making on the West. It downplays the ambivalence of the globalizing momentum and ignores the role of local reception of western culture – for example, the indigenization of western elements. It fails to see the influence nonwestern cultures have been exercising on one another. It has no room for crossover culture, as in the development of "third cultures" such as world music. It overrates the homogeneity of western culture and overlooks the fact that many of the standards exported by the West and its cultural industries themselves turn out to be of culturally mixed character if we examine their cultural lineages. Centuries of South–North cultural osmosis have resulted in intercontinental crossover culture. European and western culture are *part* of this global mélange. This is an obvious case if we reckon that Europe until the fourteenth century was invariably the recipient of cultural influences from the "Orient."[3] The hegemony of the West dates only from very recent time, from 1800 and, arguably, from industrialization.

One of the terms offered to describe this interplay is the *creolization* of global culture (Hannerz 1987). This approach is derived from Creole languages and linguistics. Creolization is itself an odd, hybrid term. In the Caribbean and North America it stands for the mixture of African and European (the Creole cuisine of New Orleans, etc.), while in Latin America *criollo* originally denotes those of European descent born on the continent.[4] "Creolization" means a Caribbean window on the world. Part of its appeal is that it goes against the grain of nineteenth-century racism and the accompanying abhorrence of métissage as miscegenation, as in the view that race mixture leads to decadence and decay for in every mixture the lower element is bound to predominate. The doctrine of racial purity involves the fear of and *dédain* for the half-caste. By stressing and foregrounding the *mestizo* factor, the mixed and in-between, creolization highlights what has been hidden and valorizes boundary

crossing. It also implies an argument with westernization: the West itself may be viewed as a mixture and western culture as a Creole culture.

The Latin American term *mestizaje* also refers to boundary crossing mixture. Since the early 1900s, however, this has served as a hegemonic élite ideology, which refers to "whitening" or Europeanization as the overall project for Latin American countries: the European element is supposed to maintain the upper hand and through the gradual "whitening" of the population and culture, Latin America is supposed to achieve modernity (Graham 1990; Whitten and Torres 1992). A limitation of both creolization and mestizaje is that they are confined to the experience of the post-sixteenth-century Americas.

Another terminology is the "orientalization of the world," which is referred to as "a distinct global process" (Featherstone 1990). In Duke Ellington's words, "We are all becoming a little Oriental" (quoted in Fischer 1992: 32). It is reminiscent of the theme of "East wind prevails over West wind" that runs through Sultan Galiev, Mao, and Abdel-Malek. In the setting of the rise of China and the Asian newly industrialized countries, it evokes the twenty-first century as an "Asian century" and the Asian Renaissance (Park 1985, Ibrahim 1996).

Each of these terms – creolization, mestizaje, orientalization – opens a different window on the global mélange. In the United States, *crossover* culture denotes the adoption of black cultural characteristics by European Americans and of white elements by African Americans. As a general notion, crossover culture may aptly describe long-term global intercultural osmosis and global mélange. Still what are not clarified are the *terms* under which cultural interplay and crossover take place. In terms such as global mélange, what is missing is acknowledgment of the actual unevenness, asymmetry, and inequality in global relations.

Theorizing Hybridity

Given the backdrop of nineteenth-century discourse, it's no wonder that those arguments that acknowledge hybridity often do so on a note of regret and loss – loss of purity, wholeness, authenticity. Thus according to the sociologist Hisham Sharabi, neopatriarchical society in the contemporary Arab world is "a new, hybrid sort of society/culture," "neither modern nor traditional" (1988: 4). The "neopatriarchal petty

bourgeoisie" is likewise characterized as a "hybrid class" (1988: 6). This argument is based on an analysis of "the political and economic conditions of distorted, dependent capitalism" in the Arab world (1988: 5), in other words, it is derived from the framework of dependency theory.

In arguments such as these hybridity functions as a negative trope, in line with the nineteenth-century paradigm according to which hybridity, mixture, mutation are negative developments that detract from prelapsarian purity – in society and culture as in biology. Since the development of Mendelian genetics in the 1870s and subsequently in early twentieth-century biology, however, a revaluation has taken place according to which crossbreeding and polygenic inheritance have come to be positively valued as enrichments of gene pools. Gradually this has been seeping through in wider circles; the work of the anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972), as one of the few to connect the natural sciences and the social sciences, has been influential in this regard.

In poststructuralist and postmodern analysis, hybridity and syncretism have become keywords. Thus, hybridity is the antidote to essentialist notions of identity and ethnicity (Lowe 1991). Cultural syncretism refers to the methodology of montage and collage, to "cross-cultural plots of music, clothing, behaviour, advertising, theatre, body language, or . . . visual communication, spreading multi-ethnic and multicentric patterns" (Canevacci 1993: 3; 1992). Interculturalism, rather than multiculturalism, is a keynote of this kind of perspective. But it also raises different problems. What is the political portée of the celebration of hybridity? Is it merely another sign of perplexity turned into virtue by those grouped on the consumer end of social change? According to Ella Shohat, "A celebration of syncretism and hybridity per se, if not articulated in conjunction with questions of hegemony and neo-colonial power relations, runs the risk of appearing to sanctify the *fait accompli* of colonial violence" (1992: 109). Hence, a further step is not merely to celebrate but to theorize hybridity.

A theory of hybridity would be attractive. We are so used to theories that are concerned with establishing boundaries and demarcations among phenomena – units or processes that are as neatly as possible set apart from other units or processes – that a theory that instead would focus on fuzziness and mélange, cut'n'mix, crisscross and crossover, might well be a relief in itself. Yet, ironically, of course, it would have to prove itself by giving as neat as possible a

version of messiness, or an unhybrid categorization of hybridities.

By what yardstick would we differentiate hybridities? One consideration is in what context hybridity functions. At a general level, hybridity concerns the mixture of phenomena that are held to be different, separate; hybridization then refers to a *cross-category* process. Thus with the linguist Bakhtin (1968) hybridization refers to sites, such as fairs, that bring together the exotic and the familiar, villagers and townspeople, performers and observers. The categories can also be cultures, nations, ethnicities, status groups, classes, genres, and hybridity by its very existence blurs the distinctions among them. Hybridity functions, next, as part of a power relationship between center and margin, hegemony and minority, and indicates a blurring, destabilization or subversion of that hierarchical relationship.

One of the original notions of hybridity is *syncretism*, the fusion of religious forms. Here we can distinguish syncretism as *mimicry* – as in Santería, Candomblé, Vodûn, in which Catholic saints serve as masks behind which non-Christian forms of worship are practiced (Thompson 1984). The Virgin of Guadeloupe as a mask for Pacha Mama is another example. On the other hand, we find syncretism as a mélange not only of forms but also of beliefs, a merger in which both religions, Christian and native, have changed and a "third religion" has developed (as in Kimbangism in the Congo).

Another phenomenon is hybridity as migration mélange. A common observation is that second generation immigrants, in the West and elsewhere, display mixed cultural traits – a separation between and, next, a mix of a home culture and language (matching the culture of origin) and an outdoor culture (matching the culture of residence), as in the combination "Muslim in the daytime, disco in the evening" (Feddema 1992).

In postcolonial literature, hybridity is a familiar and ambivalent trope. Homi Bhabha (1990) refers to hybrids as intercultural brokers in the interstices between nation and empire, producing counternarratives from the nation's margins to the "totalizing boundaries" of the nation. At the same time, refusing nostalgic models of precolonial purity, hybrids, by way of mimicry, may conform to the "hegemonized rewriting of the Eurocentre." Hybridity, in this perspective, can be a condition tantamount to alienation, a state of homelessness. Smadar Lavie comments: "This is a response-oriented model of hybridity. It

lacks agency, by not empowering the hybrid. The result is a fragmented Otherness in the hybrid" (1992: 92). In the work of Gloria Anzaldúa and others, she recognizes, on the other hand, a community-oriented mode of hybridity, and notes that "reworking the past exposes its hybridity, and to recognize and acknowledge this hybrid past in terms of the present empowers the community and gives it agency" (ibid.).

An ironical case of hybridity as intercultural cross-over is mentioned by Michael Bérubé, interviewing the African American literary critic Houston Baker, Jr.: "That reminds me of your article in *Technoculture*, where you write that when a bunch of Columbia-graduate white boys known as Third Bass attack Hammer for not being black enough or strong enough... *that's* the moment of hybridity" (1992: 551).

Taking in these lines of thought, we can construct a *continuum of hybridities*: on one end, an assimilationist hybridity that leans over towards the center, adopts the canon and mimics hegemony and, at the other end, a destabilizing hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, subverts the center. Hybridities, then, may be differentiated according to the components in the mélange: an assimilationist hybridity in which the center predominates – as in V.S. Naipaul, known for his trenchant observations such as there's no decent cup of coffee to be had in Trinidad; a posture that has given rise to the term Naipaulitis – and on the other hand, a hybridity that blurs (passive) or destabilizes (active) the canon and its categories. Perhaps this spectrum of hybridities can be summed up as ranging from Naipaul to Salman Rushdie (cf. Brennan 1989), Edward Said, and Subaltern Studies. Still what does it mean to destabilize the canon? It is worth reflecting on the politics of hybridity.

Politics of Hybridity

Relations of power and hegemony are inscribed and reproduced *within* hybridity for wherever we look closely enough we find the traces of asymmetry in culture, place, descent. Hence, hybridity raises the question of the *terms* of mixture, the conditions of mixing. At the same time, it's important to note the ways in which hegemony is not merely reproduced but *refigured* in the process of hybridization. Generally, what is the bearing of hybridity in relation to political engagement?

At times, the anti-essentialist emphasis on hybrid identities comes dangerously close to dismissing all searches for communitarian origins as an archaeological excavation of an idealized, irretrievable past. Yet, on another level, while avoiding any nostalgia for a prelapsarian community, or for any unitary and transparent identity predating the "fall," we must also ask whether it is possible to forge a collective resistance without inscribing a communal past. (Shohat 1992: 109)

Isn't there a close relationship between political mobilization and collective memory? Isn't the remembrance of deeds past, the commemoration of collective itineraries, victories and defeats – such as the Matanza for the FMLN in El Salvador, Katipunan for the NPA in the Philippines, Heroes Day for the ANC – fundamental to the symbolism of resistance and the moral economy of mobilization? Still, this line of argument involves several problems. While there may be a link, there is no necessary symmetry between communal past/collective resistance. What is the basis of bonding in collective action – past or future, memory or project? While communal symbolism may be important, collective symbolism and discourse merging a heterogeneous collectivity in a common project may be more important. Thus while Heroes Day is significant to the ANC (December 16 is the founding day of Umkhonto we Sizwe), the Freedom Charter and, specifically, the project of nonracial democracy (nonsexism has been added later) has been of much greater importance. These projects are not of a communal nature: their strength is precisely that they transcend communal boundaries. Generally, emancipations may be thought of in the plural, as an ensemble of projects that in itself is diverse, heterogeneous, multivocal.[5] The argument linking communal past/collective resistance imposes a unity and transparency which in effect reduces the space for critical engagement, for plurality *within* the movement, diversity within the process of emancipation. It privileges a communal view of collective action, a primordial view of identity, and ignores or downplays the importance of *intra*-group differences and conflicts over group representation, demands, and tactics, including reconstructions of the past. It argues as if the questions of whether demands should be for autonomy or inclusion, whether the group should be inward or outward looking, have already been settled, while in reality these are political dilemmas. The nexus between communal past/collective engagement is one strand in political mobilization, but so

are the hybrid past/plural projects, and in everyday politics the point is how to negotiate these strands in roundtable politics. This involves going beyond a past to a future orientation – for what is the point of collective action without a future? The lure of community, powerful and prevalent in left as well as right politics, has been questioned often enough. In contrast, hybridity when thought through as a politics may be subversive of essentialism and homogeneity, disruptive of static spatial and political categories of center and periphery, high and low, class and ethnos, and in recognizing multiple identities, widen the space for critical engagement. Thus, the nostalgia paradigm of community politics has been contrasted to the landscape of the city, along with a reading of "politics as relations among strangers" (Young 1990).

What is the significance of this outlook in the context of global inequities and politics? Political theory on a global scale is relatively undeveloped. Traditionally political theory is concerned with the relations between sovereign and people, state and society. It's of little help to turn to the "great political theorists" from Locke to Mill for they are all essentially concerned with the state–society framework. International relations theory extrapolates from this core preoccupation with concepts such as national interest and balance of power. Strictly speaking, international relations theory, at any rate neorealist theory, precludes global political theory. In the absence of a "world society," how can there be a worldwide social contract or global democracy? This frontier has opened up through ideas such as global civil society and the transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations: "The growth of global civil society represents an ongoing project of civil society to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world politics" (Lipschutz 1992: 391). While global society and postinternational politics are relevant, a limitation to these reconceptualizations remains the absence of legal provisions that are globally binding rather than merely in interstate relations. Hence new initiatives such as the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol are particularly significant.

The question remains what kind of conceptual tools we can develop to address questions such as the double standards prevailing in global politics: perennial issues such as western countries practicing democracy at home and imperialism abroad; the edifying use of terms such as self-determination and sovereignty while the United States invades Panama, Grenada, or Iraq. The term *imperialism* may no longer be adequate to address the present situation. It may be adequate in relation to U.S. actions in Panama or Grenada, but less so to describe the Gulf War. Empire is the control exercised by a state over the domestic and foreign policy of another political society (Doyle 1986: 45), which is not an adequate terminology to characterize the Gulf War episode. If we consider that major actors in today's global circumstance are the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization, transnational corporations, and regional investment banks, it is easy to acknowledge their influence on the domestic policies of countries from Brazil to the Philippines; but the situation differs from imperialism in two ways: the actors are not states and the foreign policy of the countries involved is not necessarily affected. The casual use of terms such as recolonization or neocolonialism to describe the impact of IMF conditionalities on African countries remains just that, casual. The situation has changed also since the emergence of regional blocs which can potentially exercise joint foreign policy (e.g., the European Union) or which within themselves contain two or more "worlds" (e.g., NAFTA, APEC). Both these situations differ from imperialism in the old sense. Literature in international political economy shows a shift from "imperialism" to "globalization." According to Tomlinson,

> the distribution of global power that we know as "imperialism"... characterised the modern period up to, say, the 1960s. What replaces "imperialism" is "globalisation." Globalisation may be distinguished from imperialism in that it is a far less coherent or culturally directed process. ... The idea of "globalisation" suggests interconnection and interdependency of all global areas which happens in a less purposeful way. (1991: 175)

This is a particularly narrow interpretation in which globalization matches the epoch of late capitalism; still what is interesting is the observation that the present phase of globalization is less coherent and less purposeful than imperialism. Domination may be more dispersed, less orchestrated, more heterogeneous. To address global inequalities and develop global political theory a different kind of conceptualization is needed. We are not without points of reference but we lack a theory of global political action. The sociologist Alberto Melucci has discussed the "planetarization" of collective action (1989). Some of the implications of globalization for democracy have been examined by Held (1992). As regards

the basics of a global political consensus, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and its amendments by the Movement of Nonaligned Countries, may be a point of reference (Parekh 1992).[6]

Post-hybridity?

Cultural hybridization refers to the mixing of Asian, African, American, European cultures: hybridization is the making of global culture as a global mélange. As a category, hybridity serves a purpose based on the assumption of *difference* between the categories, forms, beliefs that go into the mixture. Yet the very process of hybridization shows the difference to be relative and, with a slight shift of perspective, the relationship can also be described in terms of an affirmation of *similarity*. Thus, the Catholic saints can be taken as icons of Christianity but can also be viewed as holdovers of pre-Christian paganism inscribed in the Christian canon. In that light, their use as masks for non-Christian gods is less quaint and rather intimates transcultural pagan affinities.

Ariane Mnouchkine's use of Kabuki style to stage a Shakespeare play leads to the question which Shakespeare play? The play is *Henry IV*, which is set in a context of European high feudalism. In that light, the use of Japanese feudal Samurai style to portray European feudalism (Kreidt 1987: 255) makes a point about transcultural historical affinities. "Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isadora Duncan," mentioned before, reflects transnational bourgeois class affinities, mirroring themselves in classical European culture. Chinese tacos and Irish bagels reflect ethnic crossover in employment patterns in the American fast food sector. Asian rap refers to cross-cultural stylistic convergence in popular youth culture.

An episode that can serve to probe this more deeply is the influence of Japanese art on European painting. The impact of *Japonisme* is well known: it inspired impressionism, which in turn set the stage for modernism. The color woodcuts that made such a profound impression on Seurat, Manet, Van Gogh, Toulouse Lautrec, Whistler belonged to the Ukiyo school, a genre sponsored by the merchant class, that flourished in Japan between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Ukiyo-e typically depicted urban scenes of ephemeral character, such as entertainments, theater, or prostitution, and landscapes. It was a popular art form that, unlike the high art of aristocracy, was readily available at reasonable prices in bookstores (rather than cloistered in courts or monasteries) and therefore also accessible to Europeans (Budde 1993). This episode, then, is not so much an exotic irruption in European culture, but rather reflects the fact that bourgeois sensibilities had found iconographic expression in Japan earlier than in Europe. In other words, Japanese popular art was modern before European art was. Thus, what from one angle appears as hybridity to the point of exoticism, from another angle, again, reflects transcultural class affinities in sensibilities vis-à-vis urban life and nature. In other words, the other side of cultural hybridity is transcultural compatibility.

What makes it difficult to discuss these issues is that two quite distinct concepts of *culture* are generally being used indiscriminately. The first concept of culture (culture 1) views culture as essentially territorial; it assumes that culture stems from a learning process that is, in the main, localized. This is culture in the sense of a *culture*, that is, the culture of a society or social group: a notion that goes back to nineteenth-century romanticism and that has been elaborated in twentieth-century anthropology, in particular cultural relativism – with the notion of cultures as a whole, a Gestalt, configuration. A related idea is the organic or "tree" model of culture.

A wider understanding of culture (culture 2) views culture as a general human "software" (Banuri 1990: 77), as in nature/culture arguments. This notion has been implicit in theories of evolution and diffusion, in which culture is viewed as, in the main, a *translocal* learning process. These understandings are not incompatible: culture 2 finds expression in culture 1; cultures are the vehicles of culture. But they do reflect different emphases in relation to historical processes of culture formation and hence generate markedly different assessments of cultural relations. Divergent meta-assumptions about culture underlie the varied vocabularies in which cultural relations are discussed (Table 41.2).

Culture 2 or translocal culture is not without place (there is no culture without place), but it involves an *outward looking* sense of place, whereas culture 1 is based on an *inward looking* sense of place. Culture 2 involves what the geographer Doreen Massey calls "a global sense of place": "the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct *mixture* of wider and more local social relations" (1993: 240).

Table 41.2   Assumptions about culture

Territorial Culture	Translocal Culture
endogenous	exogenous
orthogenetic	heterogenetic
societies, nations, empires	diasporas, migrations
locales, regions	crossroads, borders, interstices
community-based	networks, brokers, strangers
organic, unitary	diffusion, heterogeneity
authenticity	translation
inward looking	outward looking
community linguistics	contact linguistics
race	half-caste, half-breed, métis
ethnicity	new ethnicity
identity	identification, new identity

The general terminology of cultural pluralism, multicultural society, intercultural relations, and so on, does not clarify whether it refers to culture 1 or culture 2. Thus, relations among cultures can be viewed in a static fashion (in which cultures retain their separateness in interaction) or a fluid fashion (in which cultures interpenetrate) (Table 41.3).

Hybridization as a perspective belongs to the fluid end of relations between cultures: the mixing of cultures and not their separateness is emphasized. At the same time, the underlying assumption about culture is that of culture/place. Cultural forms are called hybrid/syncretic/mixed/creolized because the elements in the mix derive from different cultural contexts. Thus, Hannerz defines Creole cultures as follows: "Creole cultures like creole languages are those which draw in some way on two or more historical sources, often originally widely different. They have had some time to develop and integrate, and to become elaborate and pervasive" (1987: 552).

Table 41.3   Cultural relations

Static	Fluid
plural society (Furnivall)	pluralism, melting pot
multiculturalism (static)	multiculturalism (fluid), interculturalism
global mosaic	cultural flows in space (Hannerz)
clash of civilizations	third cultures

But in this sense would not every culture be a Creole culture? Can we identify any culture that is *not* Creole in the sense of drawing on one or more different historical sources?[7] A scholar of music makes a similar point about world music: "All music is essentially world music" (Bor 1994: 2).

A further question is: Are cultural elements different merely because they originate from different cultures? More often, what may be at issue, as argued above, is the *similarity* of cultural elements when viewed from the point of class, status group, life style, or function. Hence, at some stage, toward the end of the story, the notion of cultural hybridity itself unravels or, at least, needs reworking. To explore what this means in the context of globalization, we can contrast the vocabularies and connotations of globalization-as-homogenization and globalization-as-hybridization (Table 41.4).

What is common to some perspectives on both sides of the globalization/homogenization/heterogenization axis is a territorial view of culture. The territoriality of culture, however, itself is not constant over time. For some time we have entered a period of accelerated globalization and cultural mixing. This also involves an overall tendency towards the deterritorialization of culture, or an overall shift in orientation from culture 1 to culture 2. Introverted cultures, which have been prominent over a long stretch of history and overshadowed translocal culture, are gradually receding into the background, while translocal culture made up of diverse elements is coming to the foreground. This transition and the hybridization processes themselves unleash intense and dramatic nostalgia politics, of which ethnic

Table 41.4   Homogenization versus diversification

Globalization/ homogenization	Globalization/ diversification
cultural imperialism	cultural planetarization
cultural dependence	cultural interdependence
cultural hegemony	cultural interpenetration
autonomy	syncretism, synthesis, hybridity
modernity	modernities
westernization	global mélange
cultural convergence	creolization, crossover
world civilization	global ecumene

upsurges, ethnicization of nations, and religious revivalism form part.

Hybridization refers not only to the crisscrossing of cultures (culture 1) but also and by the same token to a transition from the provenance of culture 1 to culture 2. Another aspect of this transition is that due to advancing information technology and biotechnology different *modes* of hybridity emerge on the horizon: in the light of hybrid forms such as cyborgs, virtual reality and electronic simulation, intercultural differences may begin to pale to relative insignificance – although of great local intensity. Biotechnology opens up the perspective of "merged evolution," in the sense of the merger of the evolutionary streams of genetics, cultural evolution, and information technology and the near prospect of humans intervening in genetic evolution, through the matrix of cultural evolution and information technologies (Goonatilake 1991).

Forward Moves

Globalization/hybridization makes, first, an empirical case: that processes of globalization, past and present, can be adequately described as processes of hybridization. Secondly, it is a critical argument: against viewing globalization in terms of homogenization, or of modernization/westernization, as empirically narrow and historically flat.

The career of sociology has been coterminous with the career of nation state formation and nationalism, and from this followed the constitution of the object of sociology as society and the equation of society with the nation. Culminating in structural functionalism and modernization theory, this career in the context of globalization is in for retooling. A global sociology is taking shape around notions such as social networks (rather than "societies"), border zones, boundary crossing, diaspora, and global society. In other words, a sociology conceived within the framework of nations/societies is making place for a post-inter/national sociology of hybrid formations, times, and spaces.

Structural hybridization, or the increase in the range of organizational options, and cultural hybridization, or the doors of erstwhile imagined communities opening up, are signs of an age of boundary crossing, not, surely, of the erasure of boundaries. Thus, state power remains strategic, but it is no longer the only game in town. The tide of globalization reduces the room of maneuver of states, while inter-

national institutions, transnational transactions, regional cooperation, subnational dynamics, and non-governmental organizations expand in impact and scope (Cooperrider and Dutton 1999).

In historical terms, writing diaspora histories of global culture may deepen this perspective. Due to nationalism as the dominant paradigm since the nineteenth century, cultural achievements have been routinely claimed for nations and culture has been "nationalized," territorialized. A different historical record can be constructed based on the contributions to culture formation and diffusion by diasporas, migrations, strangers, brokers. A related project would be histories of the hybridization of metropolitan cultures, that is, a counterhistory to the narrative of imperial history. Such historical inquiries may show that hybridization has been taking place all along but has been concealed by religious, national, imperial, and civilizational chauvinisms. Moreover, they may deepen our understanding of the temporalities of hybridization: how certain junctures witness downturns or upswings of hybridization, slowdowns or speedups. At the same time it follows that, if we accept that cultures have been hybrid *all along*, hybridization is in effect a tautology: contemporary accelerated globalization means the hybridization of hybrid cultures.

As such, the hybridization perspective remains meaningful only as a critique of essentialism. Essentialism will remain strategic as a mobilizational device as long as the units of nation, state, region, civilization, ethnicity remain strategic: and for just as long hybridization remains a relevant approach. Hybridity unsettles the introverted concept of culture that underlies romantic nationalism, racism, ethnicism, religious revivalism, civilizational chauvinism, and cultural essentialism. Hybridization, then, is a perspective that is meaningful as a counterweight to introverted notions of culture; at the same time, the very process of hybridization unsettles the introverted gaze, and accordingly, hybridization eventually ushers in post-hybridity, or transcultural cut-and-paste.

Hybridization is a factor in the reorganization of social spaces. Structural hybridization, or the emergence of new practices of social cooperation and competition, and cultural hybridization, or new translocal cultural expressions, are interdependent: new forms of cooperation require and evoke new cultural imaginaries. Hybridization is a contribution to a sociology of the in-between, a sociology from the interstices. This involves merging endogenous/exogenous understandings of culture. Significant perspectives in-

clude Hannerz' concern with mapping micro–macro linkages (1989) and contemporary work in geography and cultural studies (e.g., Bird et al. 1993).

In relation to the global human condition of inequality, the hybridization perspective releases reflection and engagement from the bounds of nation, community, ethnicity, or class. Fixities have become fragments as the kaleidoscope of collective experience is in motion. It has been in motion all along, and the fixities of nation, community, ethnicity, and class have been grids superimposed upon experiences more complex and subtle than reflexivity and organization could accommodate.

Notes

1   An equivalent view in international relations is Morse 1976. After arguing for globalizations in the plural, I will continue to use globalization singular because it matches conventional usage and there is no need to stress the point by way of inelegant grammar.

2   The mélange element comes across for instance in the definition of semiperiphery of Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993: 865–6): "(1) a semiperipheral region may be one that mixes both core and peripheral forms of organization; (2) a semiperipheral region may be spatially located between core and peripheral regions; (3) mediating activities between core and peripheral regions may be carried out in semiperipheral regions; (4) a semiperipheral area may be one in which institutional features are in some ways intermediate between those forms found in core and periphery." Interestingly, Chase-Dunn and Hall also destabilize the notions of core and periphery, pointing to situations "in which the 'periphery' systematically exploits the 'core'" (1993: 864). I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of *International Sociology* for alerting me to this source and the relevance of semiperiphery in this context.

3   I argue this case in Nederveen Pieterse 1994 and 1989: chapter 15.

4   As against *peninsulares*, born in the Iberian Peninsula, *indigenes*, or Native Americans, and *ladinos* and *cholos*, straddled betwixt those of European and Native American descent.

5   In *Pour Rushdie*, a collection of essays by Arab and Islamic intellectuals in support of freedom of expression, Paris is referred to as a "capitale Arabe." This evokes another notion of hybridity, one that claims a collective ground based on multiple subjectivities in the name of a universal value.

6   I use critical globalism as an approach to current configurations (Nederveen Pieterse 2001). This discussion of imperialism versus globalization is dated since in the wake of 9/11 has come a new imperial turn; this is taken up in *Globalization or Empire?* (Routledge, 2004).

7   Some of the "primitive isolates," the traditional study objects of anthropology, might be exceptions, although even this may be questioned in the long stretch of time.

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42   (Re)Asserting National Television and National Identity Against the Global, Regional, and Local Levels of World Television

Globalization of television is clearest at two levels. There is a strong globalization of media operations toward the advertising-based commercial market paradigm. That is accompanied by a systematic shift in the

forms or genres of programs that are produced, so globalized content models or patterns tend to spread. They are, however, adapted to local cultures and circumstances, a process described by Robertson (1992,